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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
v. 
JOSE MARIO JIMENEZ, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CaseNo.20000044-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996), whereby the defendant in a district court criminal action may take 
an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a final order for anything other than a first degree 
or capital felony offense. Appellant Jose Mario Jimenez ("Jimenez") was convicted of 
manslaughter with a firearm enhancement, a second degree felony offense in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205 (1995), and two counts of attempted manslaughter with 
firearm enhancements, both third degree felony offenses in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 76-5-205 and 76-4-101 (1995). A copy of each judgment is attached hereto as 
Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The issues presented for review are as follows: 
1. Whether the trial court erred in failing to grant a motion for a mistrial/new trial 
in connection with improper statements and suggestions made by the prosecutor during 
cross-examination of defense witnesses. 
Standard of Review: M[I]f a trial court has applied the correct legal standard, it has 
broad discretion in granting or denying a motion for a new trial." State v. Martin, 1999 
UT 72, Tf5, 984 P.2d 975. In determining whether a prosecutor's deliberate misconduct 
constituted an abuse of discretion and deprived a defendant of a fair trial sufficient to 
warrant a new trial, this Court will apply a two-part test: 
[The test examines whether] f,[l] [t]he actions or remarks of [the prosecutor] call 
to the attention of the jury a matter it would not be justified in considering in 
determining its verdict and, [2] if so, under the circumstances of the particular 
case, whether the error is substantial and prejudicial such that there is a reasonable 
likelihood that, in its absence, there would have been a more favorable result" [for 
the defendant]. 
State v. Basta, 966 P.2d 260, 268 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting State v. Tennev, 913 P.2d 
750, 754 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 923 P.2d 693 (Utah 1996)); State v. Trov, 688 P.2d 
483, 486 (Utah 1984); see also State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35, f22, 392 Utah Adv. Rep. 3. 
2. Whether the trial court erred in failing to grant a mistrial/new trial in connection 
with improper statements made by the prosecutor during closing argument. 
Standard of Review: See the standard of review set forth above. 
3. Whether the cumulative effect of the errors in the case denied Jimenez a fair 
trial. 
Standard of Review: Reversal is appropriate if the cumulative effect of the several 
errors undermines confidence that a fair trial was had. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 
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1229 (Utah 1993). In assessing cumulative error, this Court considers all the identified 
errors as well as errors this Court assumes may have occurred. Id. 
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT 
The first issue is preserved in the record on appeal (f,R.M) at 343:369; 344:403, 
444, 450-59. The second issue is preserved at R. 345:659, 667, 701. The third issue 
concerning cumulative error is reviewed on direct appeal where the record is adequate. 
See e.g. Dunn. 850 P.2d at 1229. 
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following rule will be determinative of the issues on appeal: Utah R. Crim. P. 
24 (2000). The text of that provision is attached hereto as Addendum B. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, Disposition in the Court Below. 
On July 29, 1998, the state filed an amended Information against Jimenez, 
charging him with one count of murder, a first degree felony offense, and two counts of 
attempted murder, second degree felony offenses, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-
5-203 (Supp. 1996) and 76-4-101 (1995). (R. 4-6.) The charges stemmed from an 
incident that occurred on or about October 20, 1996. After the preliminary hearing (see 
R. 48), the case was bound over for trial. 
On September 13, 1999, a four-day jury trial commenced. (See R. 342-345.) At 
the conclusion of trial, the jury found Jimenez guilty of one count of manslaughter and 
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two counts of attempted manslaughter. The jury also found Jimenez guilty of using a 
firearm in connection with each count. (R. 282-87.) On November 29, 1999, the judge 
sentenced Jimenez to an indeterminate prison term for each offense. (R. 308, 311,314.) 
Jimenez filed a timely notice of appeal. (R. 321.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. THE STATE'S EVIDENCE. 
The state presented evidence at trial as follows: 
Police Responded to a Shooting at a 7-11 Convenience Store. 
On October 20, 1996, police responded to a shooting at a 7-11 convenience store at 
4100 South Redwood Road. (R. 343:201, 216; see also 343:227, 304.) Henry David 
Miera ("Miera") had been shot. Two other individuals, Anthony Montoya ("Montoya") 
and Manuel Rios ("Rios"), claimed the suspect shooter fired a weapon at them as well. A 
convenience store security camera recorded most of the incident on tape and was secured 
by police as evidence. (R. 343:310-11.) 
The 7-11 Video Was Played at Trial. 
The video, played in its entirety at trial (R. 343:231), showed Rios, Miera and 
Montoya pulling up to the 7-11 in a white car. Rios got out of the car and entered the 
store to use the restroom. (R. 343:232.) A couple minutes later, a male - later identified 
as Jimenez - and his wife Monica pulled up in a black car and stepped out of the vehicle. 
Jimenez walked up to the white car while Monica went into the store. (R. 343:233-34.) 
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As Rios walked out of the store, he observed Jimenez in a confrontation with 
Montoya. (See R. 343:234-35, 275; 344:436.) Montoya was standing outside the white 
car, while Miera was sitting in the driver's seat. (R. 343:234-35, 275; 344:434.) 
Rios walked up to Jimenez and asked whether he "had a problem." (R. 343:234-
35.) Jimenez responded with the same question as Montoya walked around the car 
toward Jimenez. (R. 343:235.) According to Rios, the expression, "you got a problem," 
means "[do you] want to fight or something." (R. 343:243-44.) 
Thereafter, Rios punched Jimenez "[pjretty good[.]" (R. 343:235-36.) According 
to Rios, he hit Jimenez because he was "going for something in the front of his pants[.]" 
(R. 343:236, 276, 278.) Other evidence presented by the state supported that Jimenez was 
not "going for something"; rather, Rios punched Jimenez without justification. (See R. 
343:280 (Rios testified in earlier proceedings that the first time he observed the gun was 
after he hit Jimenez) 343:197, State's Exhibit 3 (interview with television reporter where 
Montoya disclosed that he and Rios contemplated punching Jimenez before they learned 
he had a gun); Defendant's Exhibit 3-A (transcript of interview between Montoya and 
television reporter).) 
Rios testified that he was much bigger than Jimenez, and he was a boxer. (R. 
343:245-46.) According to Rios, he was not the kind of person who would "back down" 
during a verbal confrontation. (R. 343:246.) 
Rios believed the punch was enough to knock Jimenez out. (R. 343:276, 281.) 
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Consequently, he was surprised to see Jimenez get up from the ground. As Jimenez got 
to his feet, he pulled a gun from his waistband and began to shoot. (R. 343:236-37.) Rios 
and Montoya ran for cover and began throwing beer bottles and bundles of firewood at 
Jimenez. (R. 343:238.) 
According to the evidence, Jimenez fired approximately seven rounds. (R. 
343:308.) Two shots were fired in the direction of Miera sitting in the car. Additional 
shots were fired as Montoya and Rios ran across the front of the car and out of the range 
of the camera. (R. 343:282.) Jimenez also ran out of the range of the camera, then came 
back and left with Monica in the black car. 
When Rios and Montoya returned to the white car, they discovered that Miera had 
been shot. They pulled him from the car and began to administer mouth-to-mouth 
resuscitation. (R. 343:241.) 
According to a State Witness, Jimenez Admitted to Shooting a Man at the 7-11. 
Amber Fabela testified that Jimenez drove to her home that night after the 
shooting. (R. 343:186.) He was hysterical and claimed that he had "just killed 
somebody" at a 7-11 convenience store. (R. 343:187-88.) Jimenez denied having made 
the statement. (R.344:589.) 
Miera Died of Two Gunshot Wounds. 
The medical examiner testified that Miera died of two gunshot wounds to the chest 
area. (R. 343:293, 298, 301.) Jimenez was apprehended in 1998 and charged with one 
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count of murder and two counts of attempted murder. (R. 12-14.) 
B. THE DEFENDANT'S EVIDENCE. 
The defense presented evidence in this case to support the determination that 
Jimenez fired the gun in self-defense and to protect his wife, Monica. 
Jimenez and Monica Were Confronted by 3 Intoxicated Men and Felt in Danger. 
Jimenez testified that when he and Monica pulled in front of the 7-11, they were 
confronted by three men who were intoxicated and looking for a fight. The men engaged 
in a verbal confrontation with Jimenez, then Rios punched Jimenez and knocked him to 
the ground. Jimenez felt threatened; he determined to protect himself and Monica from 
their attackers. (R. 344:563, 573-74.) Jimenez testified that while he was on the ground, 
he observed Miera open the car door and point an object at him that appeared to be a 
weapon. (See R. 344:563-65, 438.) Jimenez pulled a weapon out from under his shirt and 
began to fire. (R. 344:563.) 
Although the Police Did Not Find a Weapon in Miera's Can the Evidence 
Supported the Determination that the Police Investigation Was Incomplete. 
After the shooting, Jimenez and Monica left the 7-11 store. According to the 
video, Rios and Montoya did not return to the white car for some time. They were out of 
the range of the video camera (R. 344:536-37), and it is unknown what they were doing. 
(R. 344:539.) When Rios and Montoya were back in view of the camera, they returned to 
the white car and began removing items from it. (R. 344:537.) One item appeared to be 
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cans of beer; another item was unidentified. (R. 344:538.) Rios and Montoya may have 
thrown the items into the garbage can. (R. 344:538.) 
When officers arrived on the scene, they checked an area near the garbage can for 
the cans of beer, which they located immediately. Thereafter, the officers discontinued 
their search of the garbage cans. (R. 343:344-45.) 
Jimenez maintains that Rios and Montoya hid the object or weapon that Miera 
used to threaten Jimenez in the vicinity. Since the officers did not describe their 
investigative efforts in their reports and did not appear to search the immediate vicinity or 
garbage cans for a possible weapon (see R. 344:524-25), the state was unable to present 
compelling evidence to refute the possibility that Rios and Montoya concealed a weapon 
in the area. (See R. 344:554 (officers investigating scene did not describe areas searched 
or specify that they searched the garbage cans or that they searched for weapons).) 
In addition, the defense presented evidence to support that a routine investigation 
would have involved a thorough search of the area, including the garbage cans, and a pat-
down search of victims and witnesses to determine if they were armed. (R. 344:521, 524, 
529-30.) According to the evidence, such an investigation did not occur in this case. 
(See R. 343:317-342, 344-45; 344:524.) 
C. THE JURY ACQUITTED JIMENEZ OF THE CHARGES BROUGHT BY 
THE STATE AND CONVICTED HIM OF LESSER OFFENSES. 
The jury acquitted Jimenez of murder and attempted murder, and convicted him of 
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manslaughter and attempted manslaughter. (R. 282-87.) Additional facts relating to the 
issues on appeal are set forth below. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Prior to the trial in this case, the defense moved to have evidence of Jimenez's 
alleged, prior bad acts and crimes suppressed. The state stipulated to the motion and the 
trial judge granted it. Thereafter, in violation of the court's order and in violation of the 
rules of evidence, the prosecutor interjected improper statements and innuendoes at trial. 
Specifically, the prosecutor made improper statements and suggestions concerning 
Jimenez's character, as follows: (a) The prosecutor suggested to the jury that Jimenez 
used numerous aliases, (b) The prosecutor suggested that Jimenez had a violent history, 
(c) The prosecutor asserted during Monica's examination that Jimenez's possession of a 
gun was a crime "in and of itself," thereby suggesting to the jury that it should consider 
matters that were not properly before it, and (d) The prosecutor asked Monica if she 
assisted in "concealing" Jimenez from police, again suggesting to the jury that it should 
consider matters that were not properly before it. 
On appeal, Jimenez maintains that the improper statements called the attention of 
the jurors to matters they were not justified in considering. In addition, under the 
circumstances of this case, there was a probability that the jurors were influenced by the 
prosecutor's remarks, resulting in reversible error. 
Also, during closing argument, the prosecutor compared Jimenez's appearance at 
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trial in a suit and tie to the appearance of Rios, a state witness who wore prison clothes 
and shackles to the trial. The prosecutor argued that the jury could trust Rios because 
they could trust his appearance; however, they should not trust Jimenez because they 
could not trust the way he was "packaged." The prosecutor's comments were unfair; he 
sought to discredit Jimenez because he had exercised his right to attend trial dressed "in 
the 'garb of innocence.'" State v. Mitchell 824 P.2d 469, 473 (Utah App. 1991) 
(recognizing that defendant is entitled to be tried in a suit since that comports with the 
presumption of innocence). The improper comparison called the attention of jurors to 
matters they were not justified in considering. In addition, the comments were 
prejudicial, thereby requiring reversal of this matter on appeal. 
Finally, the errors individually and collectively prejudiced Jimenez. He 
respectfully requests that this Court reverse the conviction in this case and remand the 
matter for further proceedings. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE PROSECUTOR ENGAGED IN MISCONDUCT DURING 
HIS EXAMINATION OF DEFENSE WITNESSES. JIMENEZ WAS 
ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL AS A RESULT OF THE MISCONDUCT. 
The prosecutor in this case committed deliberate misconduct. He circumvented 
evidentiary rules and defied a pretrial order on four separate occasions in order to get 
information in front of the jury that it was not allowed to consider. As a result of the 
misconduct, Jimenez requested a new trial pursuant to Rule 24, Utah R. Crim P. 
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Rule 24 provides that a defendant may be entitled to a new trial "if there is any 
error or impropriety which had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party." 
Utah R. Crim. P. 24(a) (2000). A trial court has discretion under Rule 24 to grant a new 
trial, and an appellate court will not disturb the trial court's ruling unless it appears the 
trial court has abused its discretion to the prejudice of the defendant. See State v. Smith. 
776 P.2d 929, 931 (Utah App. 1989); see also State v. Harmon. 956 P.2d 262, 276 (Utah 
1998) (quoting State v. Hav. 859 P.2d 1, 6 (Utah 1993)) (other cites omitted). 
Prosecutorial misconduct may be grounds for a new trial. See State v. Owens. 753 
P.2d 976 (Utah App. 1988). In determining whether prosecutorial misconduct has 
deprived defendant of a fair trial, Utah appellate courts have applied a two-part test: 
[This test examines whether] "[1] [t]he actions or remarks of [the prosecutor] call 
to the attention of the jury a matter it would not be justified in considering in 
determining its verdict and, [2] if so, under the circumstances of the particular 
case, whether the error is substantial and prejudicial such that there is a reasonable 
likelihood that, in its absence, there would have been a more favorable result." 
State v. Basta. 966 P.2d 260, 268 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting State v. Tennev. 913 P.2d 
750, 754 (Utah App.), cert denied. 923 P.2d 693 (Utah 1996)); State v. Trov. 688 P.2d 
483, 486 (Utah 1984). 
The first step is "clearly met" when the prosecutor has violated a pretrial order or 
evidentiary rules. See State v. Span. 819 P.2d 329. 335 (Utah 1991V The second part of 
the test is "more difficult." IcL It refers to the prejudice analysis. "If the prejudice is 
such that there is a reasonable likelihood the jury would have reached a more favorable 
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result absent the comments, we will reverse." State v. Pearson, 943 P.2d 1347, 1352 
(Utah 1997). As set forth herein, Jimenez has met both parts of the test. 
A. DURING WITNESS EXAMINATIONS, THE PROSECUTOR 
INTERJECTED IMPROPER INNUENDOES. 
1. The Prosecutor's Statements and Suggestions. 
Applying the first part of the test, the prosecutor in this case, Howard Lemcke, 
called the attention of jurors to matters they were not justified in considering. 
Specifically, on four separate occasions during trial, the prosecutor made improper 
statements and suggestions concerning Jimenez's character, as fallows: (a) the prosecutor 
suggested to the jury that Jimenez used numerous aliases, (b) the prosecutor suggested 
that Jimenez had a violent history, (c) the prosecutor asserted during Monica's examina-
tion that Jimenez's possession of a gun was a crime "in and of itself," thereby suggesting 
to the jury that it should consider matters that were not properly before it, and (d) the 
prosecutor asked Monica if she assisted in "concealing" Jimenez from police, again 
suggesting to the jury that it should consider matters that were not properly before it. 
Although the judge sustained each objection by the defense with respect to the 
improper matters, the rulings could not have had an effect on the jury. Specifically, with 
respect to the first and second matters, while an objection was recorded when the 
prosecutor made the improper statement, the judge did not rule on the matter until after 
the jury had been excused. (See R. 343:369; 344:469; 344:403; 344:472.) Consequently, 
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the jury was not aware that the objections had been sustained. 
The timing of the ruling is relevant since the jury was instructed at the close of trial 
that if the court sustained an objection, the jury may not consider the matter. (R. 238.) 
Because the trial judge issued a ruling outside the presence of the jury, the jury was not 
aware that it could not consider the possibility that Jimenez used several aliases and/or 
had a violent past. 
With respect to the third and fourth matters, although the judge sustained each 
objection while the jury was present, the judge did not attempt to cure the impropriety. 
The judge did not instruct the jury that it must disregard the prosecutor's statement that 
Jimenez's possession of a firearm was a crime "in and of itself," and that Jimenez 
concealed himself from authorities. Thus, the jury may have determined that even if 
Jimenez was innocent of the charged offenses, he was a bad man and may as well be 
punished now that he has been caught. 
More specifically, the prosecutor engaged in improper conduct as follows. 
(a) The prosecutor suggested that Jimenez used numerous aliases. After the state 
completed examination of its witnesses, the defense presented its case. The defense 
began by stating that it intended to call Dr. Robert Rothfeder to testify with respect to 
injuries Jimenez suffered when he was severely beaten in 1994, two years before the 
incident in this matter. (See R. 344:389-92.) According to the defense, Jimenez suffered 
a skull fracture, head injuries and arm fracture when he was assaulted in Los Angeles in 
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1994. (R. 344:386, 389-390.) 
Also, the defense expected that Dr. Rothfeder would provide testimony as to what 
typically would occur physiologically when a person has been punched in the head. Dr. 
Rothfeder's testimony related to the state's evidence, which reflected the following: 
Immediately prior to the shooting, Rios punched Jimenez in the head knocking him to the 
ground. (R. 344:393-99.) 
The defense intended that Dr. Rothfeder's testimony would support the determina-
tion that Jimenez was incapable of forming a criminal mens rea due to head injuries. 
Thus, Dr. Rothfeder's testimony was presented to support an acquittal in the matter. 
In anticipation of Dr. Rothfeder's testimony, the defense called Jimenez to lay 
foundation for medical records relating to the injuries Jimenez suffered in the 1994 
assault. The defense elicited testimony from Jimenez that when he suffered the earlier 
injuries, he provided an alias to the health care providers. He represented that his name 
was Antonio Sanchez. (R. 343:366.) Jimenez testified that he used the alias because he 
did not have money for hospital care. (R. 343:366.) Jimenez described the injuries he 
suffered in 1994 and he identified the medical records relating to the matter. (R. 343:368.) 
Thereafter, during cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Jimenez the following: 
"So Mr. Jimenez, you admit you lied to the people who were providing you the medical 
care?" (R. 343:369.) Jimenez answered, "Yes." The prosecutor then asked, "[Y]ou used 
the name, what, Carlos Sanchez?" followed by, "These aren't the only other false names 
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that you've used5 are they?" (R. 343:369.) 
The prosecutor acknowledged that during the cross-examination he held up an FBI 
rap sheet. (See 344:466-67.) He also admitted that he had no admissible evidence to 
support his allegations concerning "other false names." (R. 343:369-70; 344:464, 466; see 
also 344:467 (judge ruled FBI rap sheet was inadmissible).) The defense objected to the 
examination as improper (R. 343:369). The judge did not rule on the matter until the 
third day of trial when the parties reconvened outside the presence of the jury. At that 
point, the judge sustained defendant's objection to the improper cross-examination. (R. 
344:469.) 
(b) The prosecutor suggested that Jimenez had a violent history. On the third day 
of trial, Dr. Rothfeder testified. After the defense examined him with respect to head 
injuries in general and Jimenez's injuries relating to the 1994 assault, the prosecutor 
asked during cross-examination whether Jimenez provided the doctor with his "history of 
violence[.]" (R. 344:403.) The defense objected to the question (R. 344:403) on the basis 
that it suggested to the jury that Jimenez had a violent past. (See R. 344:463.) The trial 
judge overruled the objection (R. 344:403) and allowed the prosecutor to proceed with the 
examination. (Id.) 
Thereafter, during proceedings outside the presence of the jury, the trial judge 
reversed his prior ruling. (R. 344:472.) The judge determined that while it would have 
been proper for the prosecutor to ask Dr. Rothfeder whether Jimenez had disclosed any 
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other head injuries or trauma, the prosecutor's suggestion of violent behavior "would not 
be relevant. And again I sustain[] the objection, finding that [] part of the answer would 
not be relevant." (R. 344:472.) 
(c) The prosecutor asserted during Monica's examination that Jimenez's 
possession of a gun was a crime "in and of itself," thereby suggesting to the jury that 
Jimenez had committed an uncharged crime. On the third day of trial, the defense called 
Jimenez's wife, Monica (Neomi Monica Jimenez), to testify. Monica was a witness to 
the October 20, 1996 incident. Among other things, she testified that on October 20, she 
and Jimenez went to a dance club and bar for a few hours (R. 344:433), then stopped at 
the 7-11 convenience store so that she could use the restroom. (R. 344:434.) 
She testified that when they arrived at the 7-11, there was a verbal confrontation 
between her husband and Montoya. Rios stepped outside the 7-11 store during the 
confrontation and punched her husband in the face, knocking him to the ground. (R. 
344:436-38.) She testified that when her husband stood up, he lifted his shirt and fired a 
gun. (R. 344:438-39.) After the shooting, Jimenez ran in front of the white car, then 
came running back. He told Monica to get into the car and they left. (R. 344:440.) 
On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Monica the following questions: 
[PROSECUTOR]: Did you know when you were at [the Me Mexico dance club] 
[your husband] had a concealed gun on him? 
[WITNESS]: No. 
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[PROSECUTOR]: Did you know that the concealed weapon under that 
circumstance would be a crime in and of itself? 
(R. 344:444.) The defense objected to the question on the basis that it called the jury's 
attention to an alleged criminal act that was not charged. The trial judge sustained the 
objection. (R. 344:444, 471.) Nevertheless, the damage was done. Counsel for the 
defense requested a curative instruction that the judge declined to provide. (Id. at 445.) 
(d) The prosecutor asked Monica if she assisted in "concealing" Jimenez from 
police, thereby suggesting to the jury that Jimenez unlawfully fled the jurisdiction; vet. 
Jimenez was not charged with such conduct in this case. Later, during the same cross-
examination, the prosecutor asked Monica whether she f,participate[d] in concealing" 
Jimenez "from the police" for a period of time between the date of the occurrence and his 
arrest in 1998. (R. 344:450.) Again, the defense objected to the question. Thereafter, the 
trial judge called a recess and excused the jury in order to deal with the issues. (R. 
344:450.) The question alluded to criminal conduct on the part of Jimenez that had not 
been charged in this matter. 
In addition, the question was meant to force Monica to incriminate herself, or to 
exercise her rights under the Fifth Amendment.1 
1
 The Fifth Amendment provides that a person cannot be compelled to be a witness 
against himself or herself in connection with any criminal case. The Utah Constitution 
likewise provides that an accused person "shall not be compelled to give evidence against 
himself." Utah Const, art. I, § 12. 
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The prosecutor acknowledged the purpose of the question and stated that earlier 
testimony from Monica elicited during cross-examination served as a basis for charging 
her with concealing the car; thus, additional testimony suggesting participation in 
criminal activity would be harmless: 
Your Honor, noting that the witness [Monica] has already confessed to one crime 
of hiding the car, and we're still within the statute of limitations, and that is 
tampering with evidence, we're kind of almost moot at this point on that particular 
issue. If she, in fact, wants to consult counsel, come back and say that she either 
cares to take the Fifth Amendment or she cares to testify, that would be fine. And 
the State, of course, would have to go along with that. 
(R. 344:451.) The defense objected to the prosecutor's tactics, and the trial judge 
sustained the objection. (R. 344:477.) 
2. The Law Prohibits the Prosecutor from Interjecting Information or Making 
Improper Suggestions Concerning Defendant's Character. 
An underlying premise of the criminal justice system is that a defendant must be 
tried for what he did, not who he is. Therefore, a prosecutor may not seek a conviction 
with suggestions that the defendant is a bad person. The prejudicial impact to a jury of 
the defendant's sordid background can be devastating. 
In this case, prior to trial the defense moved under Rules 609, 402, and 403, Utah 
Rules of Evidence, to exclude evidence of Jimenez's prior crimes or bad acts. (R. 155-
56.) The state stipulated to the request (see R. 193 (representing that state stipulated to 
motion)), and the trial court granted the motion. (R. 343:172.) 
Rule 609 permits a party to present evidence of prior criminal conduct only in 
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limited circumstances. Specifically, the evidence may be presented to attack the 
witness's credibility if the witness has been convicted of a crime involving dishonesty or 
a crime that is punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year. Utah R. Evid. 
609(a) (2000). Rules 402 and 403 prohibit the presentation of irrelevant evidence and 
evidence that is more prejudicial than probative in value. Utah R. Evid. 402, 403 (2000). 
Rule 404(b) likewise provides that M[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is 
not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity 
therewith." The rule specifies the circumstances under which evidence relating to such 
acts may be admissible. Utah R. Evid. 404(b) (2000). 
In this case, inasmuch as the state stipulated to the entry of an order to exclude 
evidence of bad acts and criminal conduct (see R. 155-56; 193), the prosecutor's 
references to aliases, a violent history, and uncharged criminal conduct violated the 
pretrial order and evidentiary rules. 
That is, notwithstanding the pretrial rulings and the Utah Rules of Evidence, the 
prosecutor made statements during witness examinations that called the jury's attention to 
matters the jury was not allowed to consider. See Utah R. Evid. 402, 403, 404(b), 
609(a)(1) (2000). The prosecutor improperly referred to unidentified aliases allegedly 
used by Jimenez, a violent past, and uncharged criminal conduct. See Troy, 688 P.2d at 
486-87 (counsel is obligated to avoid any reference to matters the jury is not justified in 
considering; also, prosecutor's question concerning defendant's criminal background and 
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alias was improper); State v. Bain. 575 P.2d 919 (1978) (prosecutor's reference to the fact 
that defendant fled to avoid arrest was improper). 
The improper conduct was particularly contemptuous in this case where the 
prosecutor was well aware of the pretrial ruling, and presumably aware of the evidentiary 
rules. This is not a situation where the prosecutor asked an arguably innocuous question 
that prompted the witness to blurt out the information. Rather, in a deliberate fashion, the 
prosecutor interjected the improper, offensive information in an effort to influence and 
inflame the jury. In blatant disregard of the rules and pretrial order, the prosecutor 
conveyed improper information to the jury. 
Pursuant to Rule 3.4(e), Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, a lawyer may not 
allude to any matter "that the lawyer does not reasonably believe is relevant or that will 
not be supported by admissible evidence[.]" See Troy, 688 P.2d at 486-87 (counsel is 
obligated to avoid any reference to matters the jury is not justified in considering; also, 
prosecutor's question concerning defendant's criminal background was an improper 
attempt to bias the jury). The improper questions in this matter were an attempt by the 
prosecutor to create an impression in the minds of jury members that Jimenez was a bad 
person, and should not be believed because he had a violent history, went by an unknown 
number of aliases, and violated the law by carrying a concealed weapon and fleeing the 
jurisdiction. 
In this case it was improper for the prosecutor to allude to the matters set forth 
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above. Span, 819 P.2d at 335. Jimenez has met the first prong in establishing that the 
trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion for a mistrial/new trial for 
prosecutorial misconduct. See Basta, 966 P.2d at 268. 
B. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE, THE ERROR WAS 
SUBSTANTIAL AND PREJUDICIAL. REQUIRING REVERSAL. 
A prosecutor's misconduct constitutes reversible error when the error is 
"substantial and prejudicial such that there is a reasonable likelihood that in its absence, 
there would have been a more favorable result for the defendant." Hay, 859 P.2d at 7 
(cites omitted); Harmon, 956 P.2d at 276; Pearson, 943 P.2d at 1352; Troy, 688 P.2d at 
486-87; see Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1224 (citing State v. Andreason. 718 P.2d 400, 403 (Utah 
1986)). 
When the prosecutor improperly suggests to the jury that defendant has gone by 
several aliases, has a sordid or violent history, or has committed uncharged crimes, those 
suggestions individually and cumulatively may have an enormous impact on a 
defendant's case. The error is substantial. 
In this case, although the prosecutor did not elicit a response to his improper 
questions, the effect was devastating: the jury was left with the impression that the 
defense objected to the questions in order to hide information about Jimenez. 
The improper questions in this case presented the jury with an opportunity to 
assume that Jimenez was a bad person and was probably guilty of the crimes at issue 
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because he was violent or had committed other crimes, or that Jimenez had something to 
hide about his past. "The deep tendency of human nature to punish not because [the 
defendant] is guilty this time but because he is a bad man and may as well be condemned 
now that he is caught is a tendency which cannot fail to operate with any jury, in or out of 
court." 1 A.J. Wigmore, Evidence § 57 at 1185 (Tillers rev. 1983). "The insinuation that 
other evidence exists encourages the jury to determine its verdict based upon evidence 
outside the record and jeopardizes a defendant's right to a trial based upon the evidence 
presented." State v. Young. 853 P.2d 327, 349 (Utah 1993). 
In this case, the suggestion that Jimenez used aliases, had a violent history, or 
engaged in uncharged criminal conduct may have added critical weight to the 
prosecutor's case, while Jimenez was powerless to dispute it. Indeed, Jimenez could not 
dispute the implication left by the improper questions without possibly opening a door to 
the presentation of information that otherwise would be inadmissible. Thus, once the 
improper suggestions were out, if witnesses did not answer, the suggestions left the jury 
with the impression that the defense had something to hide. The improper conduct 
constituted substantial error. 
The error also was prejudicial. Utah appellate courts have ruled that prosecutorial 
misconduct is prejudicial when it is directed at the defendant, when the misconduct 
relates to an issue that the jury must decide, and when the jury is presented with a case 
that involves credibility issues surrounding the witnesses. See Troy, 688 P.2d at 486; 
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State v. Bvrd, 937 P.2d 532, 536 (Utah App. 1997). 
In Troy, 688 P.2d at 486, the prosecutor committed misconduct when he referred 
to defendant's alias and residential situation under a federal identity program, when he 
asked about defendant's "various criminal matters," and when he compared the defendant 
to criminals who have "all kinds of irrational behavior ... Hinckley is a classic example." 
Id. Since the misconduct was directed at the defendant, the supreme court determined the 
error was "qualitatively different" from misconduct directed at other witnesses: the jury 
was more likely to be influenced by the misconduct. Span, 819 P.2d at 335 (where 
misconduct is directed at defendant, court is more inclined to find that jury was unduly 
influenced by misconduct); see also State v. Wiswell 639 P.2d 146, 147 (Utah 1981); 
Byrd, 937 P.2d at 536; State v. Morrison. 937 P.2d 1293, 1297 (Utah App. 1997). 
The misconduct in this case was more egregious than that identified in Troy. 
While various defense witnesses were testifying, the prosecutor referred to an unknown 
number of aliases used by Jimenez and a violent past, and the prosecutor made allegations 
against Jimenez concerning uncharged crimes. The prosecutor's conduct was directed at 
the defendant. Also, the prosecutor raised the improper matters during the testimony of 
defense witnesses to cause the jury to believe that each witness was concealing negative 
information about Jimenez. The prosecutor presented the improper information in that 
fashion to make the jury suspicious of the defendant and the motives of each witness. On 
that basis, the prosecutor's misconduct was prejudicial. 
23 
In addition, prosecutorial misconduct is more likely to unduly influence the jury 
when the jury is presented with conflicting evidence and is required to resolve credibility 
issues. Troy, 688 P.2d at 486. "Courts have generally refused, however, to conclude that 
evidence was overwhelming in cases that ultimately rested on the jury's resolution of 
conflicting evidence, particularly where the defendant's credibility is involved." Byrd, 
937 P.2d at 536; Andreason, 718 P.2d at 403 ("When the evidence in the record is 
circumstantial or sufficiently conflicting, jurors are more likely influenced by an improper 
argument"). 
If the conclusion of the jurors is based on their weighing conflicting evidence or 
evidence susceptible of differing interpretations, there is a greater likelihood that 
they will be improperly influenced through remarks of counsel. Indeed, in such 
cases, the jurors may be searching for guidance in weighing and interpreting the 
evidence. They may be susceptible to influence, and a small degree of influence 
may be sufficient to affect the verdict. 
Trov. 688 P.2d at 486; Andreason. 718 P.2d at 403. 
To that end, this Court may consider the nature of the state's evidence and the 
defendant's case. See State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 787 (Utah App. 1991) (prejudice 
analysis compares impact of prosecutorial misconduct, other evidence of guilt and 
evidence that may absolve defendant of crime). 
Here, a pivotal issue concerned Jimenez's perceptions of danger. While Rios 
testified that he, Miera, and Montoya did not threaten Jimenez with a weapon, Jimenez 
and Dr. Rothfeder testified to Jimenez's perceptions. Dr. Rothfeder testified to the impact 
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a head injury and trauma may have on Jimenez. In addition, Monica's testimony 
supported the determination that Montoya and Miera threatened her husband. (R. 
344:436-38.) 
It is not a coincidence that the prosecutor engaged in the improper conduct during 
cross-examination of Jimenez, Dr. Rothfeder, and Monica. The improper examination 
likely made the jury distrustful of those witnesses; the jury may have believed the 
witnesses were hiding information from them concerning Jimenez's alleged violent, 
criminal, suspicious past. Thus, the jury may have considered the witnesses unworthy of 
belief. There is a reasonable likelihood that in the absence of the prosecutorial 
misconduct, the jury would have acquitted Jimenez entirely of the crimes. 
Another relevant issue in Jimenez's case was whether Miera, Montoya or Rios 
threatened Jimenez with a weapon, thereby justifying Jimenez's use of deadly force. 
Jimenez presented evidence to support the determination that officers failed to properly 
investigate the scene to determine whether Rios, Montoya and Miera possessed a weapon 
during the encounter; indeed, the officers' investigation of the crime scene was 
inadequate. Because the officers failed to conduct an adequate investigation, the state 
was unable to present compelling evidence to dispute Jimenez's claims concerning the 
weapon. 
The state and Jimenez offered conflicting versions of the events surrounding the 
matter. The case came down to the word of the defense against the word of the state's 
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witnesses. See Byrd, 937 P.2d at 536. The jury "could have found either way." Troy, 
688 P.2d at 487. The prosecutor knew that he was facing an unpredictable jury. He 
apparently found the prospect too daunting and determined to circumvent the rules to 
bolster his case. The prosecutor's tactics should not be reinforced with a finding of 
harmless error. 
The verdict in this case reflects that the jury was not overwhelmed by the state's 
evidence of guilt. A reasonable likelihood exists that the jury compromised the verdict 
and rendered a conviction for the lesser offenses because of the improper statements and 
suggestions. Without the statements, the jury may have acquitted. 
While evidence presented by the defense would have absolved Jimenez of the 
crimes, the prosecutor's improper tactics tipped the balance against him. Under these 
circumstances, the evidence against Jimenez was not so overwhelming as to overcome the 
prejudice that existed as a result of the prosecutor introducing the suggestion that Jimenez 
was a bad or violent person. In this case, there was a likelihood that jurors were 
improperly influenced by the prosecutor's improper suggestions and negative 
implications concerning the defendant. By alluding to criminal conduct that was not 
charged, a violent history, and a suspicious past, the prosecutor may have caused the jury 
to convict Jimenez for who he was and not what he allegedly did. Jimenez was pre-
judiced by the prosecutor's misconduct. The trial court erred in failing to order a new 
trial. 
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C. ALTHOUGH THE TRIAL COURT SUSTAINED THE OBJECTIONS TO 
THE PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT, THE JURY WAS ALLOWED TO 
CONSIDER THE IMPROPER INFORMATION DURING DELIBERATIONS. 
THAT IS, IN SOME INSTANCES, THE RULINGS WERE MADE OUTSIDE 
THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY. ALSO, THE TRIAL JUDGE FAILED TO 
TAKE CORRECTIVE MEASURES IN THE FACE OF THE IMPROPER 
CONDUCT. 
Although the trial court sustained the defense's objections to the four occasions of 
prosecutorial misconduct during cross-examination, the judge in two instances did not 
sustain the objections in front of the jury. In addition, the trial judge made no attempt to 
cure the damage caused by the misconduct. Thus, the jurors were not instructed to 
disregard the statements, and they were not informed that they may not draw any negative 
inference about Jimenez from the statements and suggestions.2 
2
 At the close of trial, jurors were generally instructed that they should "not consider as 
evidence any statement of counsel made during the trial." (R. 250.) That instruction may 
be relevant where counsel has made an assertion of fact that is not supported by the 
evidence. Such an instruction may not be sufficient to cure the misconduct here. 
In this case, the prosecutor asked questions in such a way as to cause the jury to 
make an improper presumption or to draw an improper inference. 
Stated another way, while the prosecutor may attack a witness's credibility with 
evidence of prior crimes, etc., such evidence, even if admissible, may not be used for 
substantive purposes. Even if the state had presented evidence of prior bad acts, the jury 
would only be allowed to consider the evidence for impeachment purposes. 
In this case, a proper curative instruction would have advised the jury to disregard 
the statements in their entirety and to refrain from drawing any adverse presumptions 
from the statements. The jury was not instructed in that fashion in connection with the 
improper statements. Indeed, because the jury was not advised that the objections were 
sustained or the statements were improper, the jury was not aware that it was prohibited 
from drawing any adverse inferences from the remarks. 
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Also, the prosecutor added insult to injury when he made reference to his improper 
statements during closing argument. Specifically, during surrebuttal, the prosecutor 
stated, "We talked about [Jimenez] going into something with a concealed firearm 
because of his propensity to obey or not to obey the law." (R. 345:694.) The prosecutor 
was referring to the improper statement he made during Monica's cross-examination: 
"Did you knowr that the concealed weapon under that circumstance would be a crime in 
and of itself?" (R. 344:444.) Reference to the improper statement was one of the last 
statements the prosecutor made to the jury before deliberations, thereby ensuring the 
prejudicial effect of his misconduct. 
The prosecutorial misconduct was not properly cured in this case. In some 
instances the jury was never informed that it could not consider the improper statements 
and innuendoes. For the reasons set forth herein, Jimenez respectfully requests that this 
Court reverse the matter and remand the case for further proceedings. 
POINT II. THE PROSECUTOR ENGAGED IN MISCONDUCT DURING 
CLOSING ARGUMENT WHEN HE COMPARED JIMENEZ'S 
APPEARANCE AT TRIAL IN A SUIT, WITH RIOS'S APPEARANCE AT 
TRIAL IN PRISON CLOTHES AND SHACKLES. 
A. THE PROSECUTOR MADE IMPROPER REMARKS DURING CLOSING 
ARGUMENT. 
As set forth above (Point I, supra), the Utah Supreme Court has established a two 
prong test for reversals for improper statements of counsel. The test considers whether 
the remarks of counsel "call to the attention of the jurors matters which they would not 
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be justified in considering in determining their verdict," and whether the jurors were 
"probably influenced by those remarks." State v. Valdez, 513 P.2d 422, 426 (Utah 
1973); accord State v. Emmett 839 P.2d 781, 785 (Utah 1992); Troy. 688 P.2d at 486; 
State v. Palmer. 860 P.2d 339, 342 (Utah App. 1993). 
In this case, during closing argument, the prosecutor called improper matters to the 
attention of jurors. Specifically, the prosecutor unfairly commented on Jimenez's 
character and sought to place his credibility in issue by comparing him to Rios. Rios was 
a state witness, who attended trial in prison clothes and shackles. (R. 343:226.) Rios 
admitted at trial that he was imprisoned on four counts of aggravated assault and 
attempted aggravated burglary. (R. 343:226.) He also committed manslaughter. (R. 
343:226.) 
During closing argument the prosecutor argued that Rios was honest in who he 
was, as reflected in the fact that he wore prison clothes and shackles. The prosecutor also 
argued that if the jury were to compare Jimenez to Rios, the same could not be said of 
Jimenez: Jimenez attended trial in a suit and tie, and he had a haircut and glasses. 
According to the prosecutor, the jury should not trust what Jimenez said because his 
appearance was a lie. Specifically, the prosecutor stated the following: 
Also I ask you this, in terms of the defendant and his credibility as to the 
events, you have had a chance to see not only the defendant in this courtroom 
today and this week with how he presents himself, with how he packages himself 
in appearance and dress and haircut and glasses and demeanor, in temper or lack 
thereof, you have seen him in every one of those aspects on October 20th, 1996. Is 
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this an honest packaging? 
Manny Rios was here in chains. Manny Rios should be in chains. But 
Manny Rios isn't anything except what Manny Rios is. But you have - and I 
recall - I want you to recall Mr. Shapiro's opening statement, and he was talking 
about the newly - the couple, not newly married couple, but the couple, they had 
gotten their child a baby-sitter and they were able to go out for this date. Just your 
average couple. And on the other hand we had the drunken rowdy trouble making 
boxers cruising for trouble. Is either one of those portrayals honest now that you 
know the situation? Or is it part of the packaging? 
(R. 345:659-60.) The prosecutor's remarks necessarily commented unfairly on Jimenez's 
character and they interfered with his right to the presumption of innocence. The remarks 
were improper; they called attention to matters that should not have been considered by 
jurors in reaching their verdict. The defense objected and moved for a mistrial. The trial 
court acknowledged a timely objection, but ruled that a mistrial was not warranted. (R. 
345:667,701,708-09.) 
This Court has recognized that a defendant has the right to be "tried in front of a 
jury in the 'garb of innocence[.]'n State v. Mitchell 824 P.2d 469, 473 (Utah App. 1991). 
"Numerous cases support the view that this right is an essential component of a fair and 
impartial trial." Id; see also State v. Bennett. 2000 UT 25, ffl[3-4, 387 Utah Adv. Rep. 
74; Chess v. Smith. 617 P.2d 341, 344 (Utah 1980). "The prejudicial effect that flows 
from a defendant's appearing before a jury in identifiable prison garb is not measurable, 
and it is so potentially prejudicial as to create a substantial risk of fundamental unfairness 
in a criminal trial." Chess. 617 P.2d at 344. Thus, attending trial in the "garb of 
innocence" comports with fundamental fairness and the basic presumption of innocence. 
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A prosecutor's comment on such a matter, as though the defense were attempting 
to present a deceptive image of the defendant, should be considered as offensive as a 
prosecutor's comments on a defendant's right to remain silent while in police custody, see 
Dovle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976) (a prosecutor may not refer to defendant's post-
Miranda silence to suggest guilt), or a prosecutor's comments that defendant failed to take 
the witness stand to assert his innocence. Inasmuch as the defendant is cloaked with 
certain fundamental rights to ensure a fair trial, it is improper for the prosecutor to 
discredit a defendant and to criticize his character in front of the jury because he has 
exercised those rights. Indeed, such remarks on the part of the prosecutor generally have 
been construed to interfere with a defendant's right to a fair trial. See State v. Bvrd, 937 
P.2d 532 (Utah App. 1997). The prosecutor's comments in this case were improper and 
violated Jimenez's right to a fair trial. 
B. A REASONABLE LIKELIHOOD EXISTS THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF 
THE PROSECUTOR'S IMPROPER COMMENTS, THE JURY WOULD HAVE 
RETURNED A VERDICT MORE FAVORABLE TO THE DEFENDANT. 
Under the circumstances of this case, the jury was probably influenced by the 
improper statements. Specifically, the comments were made during closing argument and 
immediately prior to jury deliberations. They undoubtedly left an impression on the 
jurors during deliberations. 
Also, when the defense objected to the comment, the trial court did not provide a 
curative instruction to alleviate possible prejudice. Rather, sometime later during 
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Lemcke's surrebuttal remarks, the judge reminded the jury that "nothing the attorneys say 
is evidence." (R. 345:689; see also R. 250 (jury was generally instructed in that same 
respect).) 
That curative instruction was not adequate where the prosecutor sought to discredit 
Jimenez's character based on the fact that Jimenez exercised a fundamental right. The 
trial court should have instructed the jury to disregard the remarks and to refrain from 
drawing any adverse inference or presumption from them. The court failed to instruct the 
jury in that respect. Thus, the instructions here were insufficient to overcome the 
prejudicial effect of the improper comment. See Kohl 2000 UT 35, ^ [24 (where pro-
secutor alluded to facts not in evidence, instructions to jury overcame prejudicial effect). 
The prosecutor compared Jimenez's appearance to Rios's specifically to impeach 
Jimenez's exculpatory version of the events. It directly linked the credibility of Jimenez's 
defense to the appearance he was entitled to present at trial. Moreover, as set forth above, 
the evidence against Jimenez was not so overwhelming. Jimenez presented evidence to 
support self-defense, including testimony to support the determination that officers failed 
to investigate the scene to determine if Miera, Montoya and Rios were armed to justify 
Jimenez's use of deadly force. 
Here, the jurors were weighing Rios's version of the events against the evidence 
presented by the defense. The evidence was susceptible of differing interpretations 
and/or it created credibility issues. Thus, there was a greater likelihood that the jurors 
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would be improperly influenced by the comments. The jurors may have been searching 
for guidance in weighing and interpreting the evidence. They may have been especially 
susceptible to influence, and a small degree of influence may have been sufficient to 
affect the verdict. Under such circumstances, the prosecutor was obligated to avoid, as 
far as possible, any reference to matters the jury would not be justified in considering. 
Troy, 688 P.2d at 486-87. 
The jury obviously was not overwhelmed by the state's case as reflected in the 
verdict for the lesser offenses. A reasonable likelihood exists that the jury compromised 
the verdict and rendered a conviction on the lesser offenses because of the improper 
comments. Since the improper remarks undermined a fundamental right, the remarks 
compel the entry of an order reversing the judgment. 
POINT III. THE ERRORS IN THIS CASE COMPEL REVERSAL UNDER 
THE CUMULATIVE-ERROR DOCTRINE. 
In the event the individual errors in this case may be harmless, the cumulative 
effect of the errors requires reversal. Whitehead v. American Motors Sales Corp., 801 
P.2d 920, 928 (Utah 1990); see also Dunn. 850 P.2d at 1229. Here, Jimenez was 
effectively denied a fair trial where the prosecutor interjected improper statements during 
cross-examination of defense witnesses, and he engaged in misconduct by attacking a 
fundamental right in closing argument to discredit the defendant's case. The prosecutor 
was aware of weaknesses in his case, and dealt with them by circumventing pretrial 
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rulings, the rules of evidence, and Jimenez's constitutional right to a fair trial. Such a 
cynical strategy should not be allowed. The errors alone and together should undermine 
this Court's confidence that "a fair trial was had." State v. Finlavson. 956 P.2d 283, 295 
(Utah App. 1998) (quoting State v. Alonzo. 932 P.2d 606, 617 (Utah App. 1997)), affd. 
2000 UT 10, 994 P.2d 1243. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Jimenez respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse the conviction in this case, and remand the matter for further proceedings as this 
Court may deem appropriate. 
SUBMITTED this iLday of , 2000. 
LINDA M. JONESj 
DAVID FINLAYSON 
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant 
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UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Rule 24. Motion for new trial. 
(a) The court may, upon motion of a party or upon its own initiative, grant 
a new trial in the interest of justice if there is any error or impropriety which 
had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party. 
Ob) A motion for a new trial shall be made in writing and upon notice. The 
motion shall be accompanied by affidavits or evidence of the essential facts in 
support of the motion. If additional time is required to procure affidavits or 
evidence the court may postpone the hearing on the motion for such time as it 
deems reasonable. 
(c) A motion for a new trial shall be made within 10 days after imposition of 
sentence,, or within such further time as the court may fix during the ten-day 
period. 
(d) If a new trial is granted, the party shall be in the same position as if no 
trial had been held and the former verdict shall not be used or mentioned 
either in evidence or in argument. 
